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BOOK REVIEWS
HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw. By Henry Rottschaefer.
St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1939. Pp. xxv, 982.
Professor Rottschaefer has in general followed the same analysis for his
text on Constitutional Law which the reviewer adopted and followed in his
text on Constitutional Law published in 1936, and which has also been
followed by Professor Dowling in his Casebook on Constitutional Law.
Under this analysis Mr. Rottschaefer first sets forth the framework of our
federal government, including separation of powers, dual form of govern-
ment, and judicial supremacy; then treats the powers of the various
branches of government; and finally discusses the limitations on these
powers of government.
The reviewer certainly would not criticize this general arrangement.
However, there are some specific problems in connection with the author's
analysis which deserve a word of comment. He has an introductory chapter
on the separation of powers and another introductory chapter on our dual
form of government, 2 and then he follows these two chapters with six
chapters stating further the powers of Congress and (after a chapter on
amendment) a chapter on the powers of the executive and a chapter on the
powers of the judiciary. The materials in these chapters originally related
to the doctrine of separation of powers, but at the present time they may
very well be taken to relate both to separation of powers and dual form of
government. However, it is hard to understand why the chapter on amend-
ment should be sandwiched in between these other chapters. The chapter on
interstate relations, of course, relates only to our dual form of government,
but is correctly treated as a part of this topic. One of the chapters on the
limitations on the powers of government is headed "Limitations on the
Taxing Power of the States," whereas most of the other headings under
this general topic refer to the protection of personal liberty. Chapters 15,
17, and 18, are discussions of the due process clause (and the equality
clause); and it would seem that they should follow each other in this
order, but for some reason the discussion of the contract clause is intro-
duced as Chapter 16 to make another sandwich. Due process as a limita-
tion on the federal taxing power is treated in connection with Chapter 7,
which discusses the federal taxing power. Due process as a matter of
procedure and due process as a matter of jurisdiction are not considered in
connection with the chapters just referred to, which treat of due process
as a matter of substance, but are treated in the last two chapters of the
textbook; and then due process as a limitation on state action is treated
separately from due process as a limitation on federal action. The reviewer
cannot see any special reason for the analysis so far as it relates to these
specific topics, but he has no criticism to make of it. So far as he would
criticize the book from this standpoint, it would be because it has not suffi-
ciently set forth the extent to which our Constitution has been made by the
United States Supreme Court.
So far as the scope of the book is concerned, it treats of practically all
1. Chapt. 3.
2. Chapt. 4.
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the topics usually treated in textbooks on Constitutional Law. The topic of
sovereignty is not treated separately but given only casual consideration,
although what the author does say about sovereignty shows that he has a
sound viewpoint with reference to the matter. Many would agree with the
slight treatment given to this topic, yet much time has been devoted to it
by the United States Supreme Court cases and it is involved by other
Constitutional Law topics, so that it might well have been accorded a little
more extensive attention. The topic of suffrage is practically omitted, and
the topic of jurisdiction of the federal courts also is omitted. Certain minor
topics, or points of Constitutional Law, also have escaped the author's
attention. In his discussion of the territory3 of the United States he does
not discuss the power to incorporate new territory. In his discussion of
aliens4 he does not discuss the question of whether they are entitled to a
judicial tribunal when they claim United States citizenship. He does not
adequately discuss the effect of war upon constitutional limitations.5 He
does not discuss the power of Congress to overthrow a treaty by a statute.0
He does not discuss separately the requirement of an orderly course of
procedure for due process as a matter of procedure. He does not give ade-
quate treatment to the constitutional social control of public utilities except
so far as concerns their furnishing facilities and their continuing their
business 7. He gives us no history of the evolution of the due process clause.
He does not set forth the work of the Supreme Court in enlarging and
modifying old constitutional limitations and creating new constitutional
limitations like due process as a matter of substance.
On the whole the statements are characterized by accuracy, but there
are a few little statements about which the reviewer would like to raise
questions. It seems to him that where on page 5 the author speaks of the
legal force of constitutions as being no greater than that of valid statutes a
distinction should be made between their force over conduct under them
and over the agencies of government. On page 13 he says the better opinion
is that the Supreme Court did not usurp its power of judicial review. Other
recent writers, like James Truslow Adams, Morris L. Ernst, Louis B.
Boudin, and Edward S. Corwin, take the opposite view; yet they are not
referred to. In the middle of page 45 there is evidently a typographical
error in printing the word "not." In the discussion of the relation between
the legislative and judiciary powers over rules of procedure (evidence
omitted) on page 52 would it not be better to say that the powers are
concurrent and separate, instead of making the judiciary powers sub-
ordinate to the legislative? He seems to take the view that there is no
federal police power except as incidental to the regular powers of the
federal government s. Of course, all of the powers of the federal government
which are not tax powers or powers of eminent domain are police powers.
3. P. 372
4. P. 375; cf. 440.
5. P. 381.
6. P. 882.
7. P. 497.
8. Pp. 88, 453.
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The interstate commerce power, for example, is a specific police power of
the federal government. Evidently the topic of reciprocal immunity from
taxation, beginning on page 96, was written before the latest decisions of
the Supreme Court, so that there is no recognition of the fact that Collector
r. Dayo has been overruled and now we have a rule of reciprocal taxation
instead of reciprocal immunity from taxation. If the historical and philo-
sophical methods had been followed more closely, the author might have
been able to anticipate this result. On page 175 he correctly states that the
federal taxing power may be used for federal police power purposes but not
for state. But the black letter heading is confusing, and the text on page
r24 is even more confusing on this point. On page 111 he says that the
federal government cannot impose duties upon any officers of the state
governments. This statement is questionable in the light of dicta as to the
power of the federal government to impose duties on state courts, as in the
case of a federal employer's liability act or the Volstead Act. In his dis-
cussion of the decision of Erie v. Tompkins,o on page 118, he does not
recognize the possibility of a federal common law in other cases than
diversity of citizenship. Should not the text on page 124 be clarified by
excepting foreign corporations engaged in interstate commerce who thereby
have as much protection against discriminations under that clause as natu-
ral persons have under the privileges and immunities clause? It would
seem the statement on page 171 as to the scope of the federal govern-
nent's spending power is stated in too limited terms. His discussion of the
commerce power of the federal government is more or less incoherent
on the issue as to whether it is an exclusive or a concurrent power and,
whether one or the other, whether it is subject to the state's police power,1
because he does not recognize as a basis for his discussion the changes in
the attitude of the United States Supreme Court with reference to the
matter. It must be taken for granted that the Supreme Court viewpoint is
that the federal government's power was a concurrent power up to the
decision of Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens,'2 an exclusive power over
matters national in scope without any rule for state police power from
Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens to Plumley v. Massachusetts,3 but from
Plumley v. Massachusetts to the present time subject to the state's general
police power even though the federal government's power is exclusive.
From page 204 on, there is a suggestion that due process does not limit
federal taxation the same as it limits state action, because the federal
government may tax for the general welfare. Is there any distinction?
On page 208, the author takes the position that the Constitution, as made
by the Supreme Court, prohibits confiscatory taxation. After the decision
of A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton,'4 it would seem that at least there was a
question about this proposition. In his discussion on page 226 of the gold
9. (U. S. 1870) 11 Wall. 113.
10. (1938) 304 U. S. 64.
11. Pp. 90, 280, 284, 320.
12. (U. S. 1851) 12 How. 299:
13. (1894) 155 U. S. 461.
14. (1934) 292 U. S. 40.
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clauses in United States bonds, he does not discuss the rationale of the
police power given in Justice Stone's dissenting opinion. Many think this
may be the ultimate rationalization of the holding in this case, if it is
adhered to. The author's rationalization of the first child labor decision
would seem to confuse due process questions with commerce questions. It
is submitted that the only rationalization of this decision is that it is
wrong and that it already has been impliedly overruled. The statement on
page 270 as to the power of Congress over foreign commerce would seem
to be an understatement. The text material on the subject of unconstitu-
tional conditions 15 has very little meaning and is perhaps inaccurate. The
correct view on this subject undoubtedly is that the only unconstitutional
conditions which a state cannot impose on a foreign corporation not en-
gaged in interstate commerce are those which affect either the powers of
the federal government or the powers of other states. Since the Dred Scott'G
decision confined to the Northwest Territory the power of Congress to
"make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other
property belonging to the United States," it would seem that this is not the
proper rationale for the federal government's power to acquire new terri-
tory. In the author's discussion of impairment of the obligation of contracts
on page 568, he develops as exceptions to the doctrine announced in the
Da rtmoutk Colleg617 decision not only arrangements which do not con-
stitute contracts but enactments in the exercise of an express or implied
reservation of power, and he includes the police power under this implied
reservation of power. But he says nothing whatever about the power of
eminent domain.18 The reviewer wonders if it would not have been better
to have made eminent domain and the police power, except for the fran-
chises and rates of public utilities, two additional exceptions, (c) and (d).
On the whole, the author's approach to his subject is orthodox. His
treatment of the materials which he has to examine is sometimes but not
always critical. In his discussion of the separation of powers he does not
rationalize the modern, growing administrative tribunals and commissions.
Sometimes he gives dogmatic statements with little rationalization.29 Some-
times he gives conflicting statements in true cyclopedic style without point-
ing out any conflicts. 20 His black letter is often very disappointing. Many
times it really says nothing.2' He makes no criticism of the rule forbidding
income taxation of judicial salaries.22 He does not attack the position of
the Supreme Court that the making of contracts and carrying of insurance
by people in different states does not amount to interstate commerce.23
His distinctions are not always clear-cut. What he has to say about taxa-
15. Pp. 326, 555.
16. (U. S. 1856) 19 How. 393.
17. (U. S. 1819) 4 Wheat. 518.
18. Pp. 568, 571, 603.
19. Pp. 242, 289.
20. Pp. 87-88.
21. Pp. 238, 369, 446, 741, 748, 756, 842.
22. P. 203.
23. P. 235.
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tion for regulation on page 176 seems to be forgotten when he discusses
the same subject on page 624. He does not criticize the decisions of state
courts in construing constitutional amendments as to compensation for
property "taken, damaged, or destroyed for public use."2'
On the other hand, he takes a great many very fine positions. His posi-
tion that the Supreme Court has now made an income tax an indirect tax25
is a courageous and careful analysis of the work of the Supreme Court.
His discussion of the police power of the states and of the federal govern-
ment (which he unnecessarily calls regulatory powers) is very fine. And
his statement as to the creative activity of the judiciary and its weighing
of values is a fine expression of the judicial process. His rationalization of
the topics of price regulation 26 and of jurisdiction for taxation 27 is espe-
cially good. He also discusses interestingly the police power of a state over
foreign contracts made by a citizen of the state as one of the parties to
the contract.28
On the whole the reviewer would say that the author in his treatment of
constitutional limitations has not sufficiently brought out the fact that
originally the purpose of the Constitution was to protect personal liberty
against government, both the national and state, whereas now the purpose
of the Constitution is more and more coming to be the protection of per-
sonal liberty of individuals by the government against economic and other
external social control by corporations and other groups; that he has not'
sufficiently set forth the history of the great constitutional doctrines; and
that he has not given the Supreme Court sufficient credit for making our
United States Constitution,
The English of the book is clear and understandable, but it is sometimes
dull and never sparkling; however, the book in general is a good Hornbook
and is incomparably better than its predecessor, which, for example, talked
about the "pursuit of happiness" as "one of the most comprehensive
[guaranties] to be found in the Constitution."
Huon E. WIws.t
THE NEw FwZRAL RuLES OF CiVL PRocEuuR, including Rules of the
United States Supreme Court, Annotated and Digested to date; Rules of
Federal Criminal Appellate Procedure, Annotated and Digested to date with
approved Forms by the United States Supreme Court. By Byron F. Babbitt.
St. Louis: Thomas Law Book Company, 1938. Pp. 362.
As frankly indicated by the author in his introduction, this work is in-
tended as a desk book for the practicing lawyer and not as an elaborate and
detailed treatment of federal procedure. The single volume is presented in
three parts. The first part consists of the new rules of federal civil proce-
24. P. 718.
25. P. 190.
26. P. 482.
27. P. 688.
28. P. 540.
t Professor of Law, Indiana University.
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